The informational opacity of small businesses makes them an interesting area for the study of banks' lending practices and procedures. We use a survey of small businesses conducted by the Federal Reserve to analyze the micro-level differences between large banks and small banks in the loan approval process. We provide evidence that large banks ($1 billion or more in assets) tend to employ standard criteria obtained from financial statements in the loan decision process, but that small banks (less than $1 billion in assets) deviate from these criteria by relying to a larger extent on the character of the borrower. Some of the results are inconsistent, however. These "cookie-cutter" and "character" approaches are compatible with the incentives and environments facing large and small banks. Capital and Credit," March 8-9, 1999, as well as our two discussants at that conference, Allen Berger and Mitchell Petersen, for their helpful comments.
distinction, indicating that only 12% of small "community banks" use credit scoring models for small business loans, whereas more than two-thirds of larger banks use such models for their small business lending.
The effect of the consolidation in banking on the availability of credit to small-business borrowers has been examined in a number of recent studies (see, e.g., Peek and Rosengren (1998) ; Strahan and Weston (1998) ; Berger et al. (1997); and Walraven 1997) ). Other studies have examined the importance of relationship banking and have explored the effects due to the differences in borrower characteristics (see, e.g., Cole (1998) ; Udell (1995, 1996) ; and Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995) ). A distinguishing feature of this study is that we focus simultaneously on characteristics of both the borrower and the lender, which enables us to examine the micro structure of the decision to lend to small businesses. In so doing, we find evidence indicating significant differences in the lending approaches of small and large banks.
The purpose of this study is to provide empirical evidence regarding any demonstrable differences in the way that large banks and small banks make small business loans. We explicitly test the hypothesis that formal financial data provided by an applicant better explain the lending decisions of large banks than of small banks. Concomitant with this test, we simultaneously estimate a regression that explains the firm's decision to apply for credit at a large bank versus a small bank. Our results provide at least limited support for our primary hypothesis. The lending decision of large banks but not of small banks is more likely to be a function of financial variables, while the lending decision of small banks but not large banks is more likely to be a function of variables indicating pre-existing relationships between the bank and loan applicant. The coefficients for some of these variables, however, indicate contrary results.
Section I surveys the relevant academic literature and shows how the current study ties these different strands together and contributes to the analysis of an important public policy question. Section II discusses relationship banking and the expected differences in the loan approval processes of large and small banks. Section III describes the small business finance survey that serves as our primary source of the data, and specifies the variables used and the hypotheses tested in the analysis. Section IV presents the empirical analysis testing our primary hypotheses. The final section offers a brief conclusion and suggestions for further research.
I. Survey of the Literature
The first of several strands of literature that are directly relevant to this study deals with credit availability and bank consolidation. Of particular concern is credit availability to small businesses. The informational problems associated with loans to small business may be more easily solved by small banks that are headquartered geographically close to the borrower than by more-distant large banks with centralized decision-making ) and greater lending opportunities. Recent empirical evidence indicates that small banks lend proportionately more to small enterprises (Nakamura (1993) ; Keeton (1995) ; ; Levonian and Soller (1995) ; Berger and Udell (1996) ; Peek and Rosengren (1996) ; Weston (1996, 1998) ; Berger et al. (2000) ).
The rapid consolidation of the banking system raises concerns that lending to small business will be reduced as small banks are absorbed by larger banks. Some studies find that mergers reduce lending to small business (Peek and Rosengren (1996) ; ), while others do not find this (Whalen (1995) ; Weston (1996, 1998) ). This reduction in lending to small business can be mitigated by the creation of new banks if the de novo banks lend more to small business than do comparable banks. Goldberg and White (1998) find that de novo banks (those in operation for less than three years) do make more small business loans. DeYoung et al. (1999) extend this study and find that as the de novo banks age they make proportionately fewer loans to small business while holding other factors constant. The formation of de novo banks appears to be important for small business lending in an era of bank consolidation.
Information about borrowers is vitally important to the lending process. Some suggest that agency costs and information asymmetries have reduced the investment flow to profitable companies (see, e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) ). Large lending institutions can produce substantial bodies of information about borrowing firms that can be very helpful in the credit decision process (see, e.g., Leland and Pyle (1977) ; Diamond (1984 Diamond ( , 1991 ). Because of scale economies and durable information, a firm having a longer pre-existing relationship with its bank should have greater availability of funds and/or lower cost of funds.
A substantial literature exists claiming that financial intermediaries have a comparative advantage in the production of information about borrowers (see e.g., Diamond (1984 Diamond ( ,1991 ; Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) ; Boyd and Prescott (1986) ). The model of Boot and Thakor (1994) predicts that, as a relationship matures, interest rates decrease and collateral requirements decline. Other models predict that interest rates will increase as the relationship lengthens (see e.g., Greenbaum et al. (1989) ; Sharpe (1990) ; Wilson (1993) ; Rajan (1992) . Finally, a number of studies measure the effect of a bank relationship on firm value, and find positive abnormal returns for events indicating renewals of the relationships (see e.g., James (1987) ; Billett et al. (1995) ). In this study, we emphasize the differences between large and small banks in their use of information about borrowers.
Five recent studies provide the most relevant empirical evidence related to the current paper.
Using data from the 1987 NSSBF (an earlier survey of small business finances conducted by the Federal Reserve Board and the U.S. Small Business Administration), Petersen and Rajan (1994) examine the value of lending relationships. They find that a relationship with an institutional lender increases the availability of financing to a small business. Relationships reduce the cost of borrowing, but this effect is smaller than the availability effect. If borrowers attempt to employ multiple lenders, the price of borrowing increases, and the availability of credit decreases.
In a second paper using data from the 1987 NSSBF, Petersen and Rajan (1995) explore the effect of credit market competition on lending relationships. Because a lender is more assured of a continuing relationship with a small-business borrower located in a more concentrated banking market, lenders tend to provide more credit at lower rates in more concentrated markets. These results hold for young firms, but weaken as the borrowing firm ages. Berger and Udell (1995) use data from the 1987 NSSBF to analyze the importance of relationship between banks and borrowers in the extension of lines of credit to small businesses. They find that lenders offered a firm with a longer relationship a lower loan rate and were less likely to require collateral. This provides additional evidence regarding the value of the information about the borrower obtained by the lender from a long-term relationship. Berger and Udell (1996) is the only study of which we are aware that examines the differences in lending practices between large and small banks. Using loan data drawn primarily from the Federal Reserve's Survey of the Terms of Bank Lending to Business, they test several hypotheses concerning relationship lending and the availability of credit to small businesses. With respect to small-business loans, Berger and Udell find that large banks charge lower loan rates, require less collateral, and issue fewer loans than do small banks. These empirical results support their hypothesis that large banks supply relatively less credit to small "relationship borrowers" but do not reduce credit to small "ratio borrowers" whose creditworthiness can be judged by examining their financial ratios. Cole (1998) examines the effect of relationships on the availability of credit by looking more carefully at the nature of the relationship. Like the current study, Cole uses data from the more recent 1993 NSSBF, which we describe in Section III. As do the studies already discussed, Cole finds that lenders are more likely to extend credit if they have a pre-existing relationship with a borrower, consistent with the generation of private information by such relationships. However, he finds no incremental effect from pre-existing relationships of longer duration than one year. Hence, his results suggest that banks generate the valuable private information about its customers quickly, and that this information can be regenerated by other banks if it is lost because of the merger or failure of the original bank. Using firm characteristics as proxies for reputation effects, he finds that the importance of firmlender relationships is independent of reputation effects.
None of these studies except Berger and Udell (1996) have explored the differences in the micro-level behavior by different types of banks. In this study, we extend the previous literature by examining behavioral differences between large and small banks in the loan approval process.
II. Large Banks and Small Banks
The previous research clearly indicates that firm-lender relationships influence the availability of credit to the firm. We hypothesize that relationships are more important for small banks than for large banks. This is due to organizational and operational differences between large and small banks, which we explore in this section.
The operational differences between small and large banks with respect to lending can be explained by the theory of hierarchical control contained in Williamson (1967) . As the size of an organization increases, loss of control occurs between successive hierarchies. As managerial orders and directions are transmitted to successive hierarchical levels, distortions increase. Consequently, a large bank needs explicit rules in the lending process in order to avoid distortions. Because there are fewer intermediaries between top management and lending officers in small banks, the small banks' loan officers can be granted more discretion in the lending process and thus are more likely to deviate from the "cookie-cutter" approach.
Similarly, large banks, which we define as those with $1 billion or more in consolidated assets, generally have more branches and are more geographically dispersed than are the small banks, which we define as those with less than $1 billion in consolidated assets. In order to keep control over the whole organization, large banks must establish procedures that will be followed throughout the whole organization. As an organization increases in size and geographic extent, it becomes more difficult for the top management to monitor the behavior of employees; agency problems arise. To ensure that loans are being granted in an appropriate manner, management must establish standards that can be followed easily by loan officers and that can be readily monitored and enforced by supervisors. Consequently, we expect large-bank managers would develop a loan approval system that would lead to a consistent approach across branches and personnel. By necessity, the approach would have to employ easily obtained and verifiable information about the borrowers, such as financial ratios obtained from company financial statements. Consequently, we expect a "cookie-cutter" approach in the loan-approval process of large banks, with standard financial variables and ratios of potential borrowers significantly affecting the credit-allocation decisions of large banks.
1
In contrast, small banks do not face agency and control problems that are as severe as those faced by large banks. Top management can more easily monitor the behavior of loan officers and coordinate the operation of various parts of the institution. There is less need to establish rigid standards for lending. More flexibility is possible and often is desirable. Small banks are likely to have more private information about potential borrowers because of proximity and a more personal relationship between banker and customer. Furthermore, ownership and management are more likely to be the same or closely allied in the small bank, thus reducing the agency problems between owners and managers described by Jensen and Meckling (1976) . Consequently, we expect small banks to use information about the borrower obtained through relationships and from other sources and thus for small banks to employ more of a "character" approach. This would mean that small banks might grant loans to customers who do not meet the standardized requirements that larger banks would employ. To confirm this hypothesis, the empirical evidence should show that small banks' lending decisions adhere less strictly to standardized financial variables than do large banks' decisions.
The empirical evidence below tests these hypotheses about the differences between large and 1 Our description of the loan-approval process that we expect to find in large banks has somewhat the flavor of credit scoring. Though the time period studied in the empirical section of this paper precedes the announced use of credit scoring methods for small-business loans by large banks, credit scoring had already been in widespread use for residential mortgage loans and household credit-card loans. It is a process for standardizing lending decisions in ways that would be especially appealing to the bureaucratic/managerial needs of large banks. For further discussions of credit scoring, see Mester (1997) and Frame et al (2000) . small banks in allocating credit to small businesses. Our evidence provides some support for the conclusion that large and small banks do behave differently.
III. Data, Hypotheses, and Methodology
The data used in this study are taken primarily from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finances (NSSBF), which was co-sponsored and co-funded by the Federal Reserve Board The loan applicants in this sample are a self-selected group. Presumably, only those enterprises whose owners believed that they had a high probability of obtaining a loan from the identified bank to which they applied would have bothered to have applied for the loan from that bank. Nevertheless, not all of them were in fact successful, and the characteristics of those who were successful and unsuccessful, as well as the characteristics of the bank that approved or rejected the application, provide us with the basis for testing our hypotheses. To try to control for the bias that might arise with respect to a loan applicant's choice of a large bank or a small bank, we have estimated a simultaneous model in which the loan applicant's choice of size of bank to which to apply and the bank's accept/reject decision with respect to that loan application are modeled by two separate equations that are estimated jointly. Table I displays the variables extracted from the NSSBF and from the FDIC Call Reports that are used in our analyses of the credit allocation decision, along with brief definitions, means, standard errors, and ranges. 4 The remainder of this section will expand on those variable definitions and on how we will use the variables to test the hypotheses discussed in Section III.
The dependent variable that we use in all of our tests of the accept/reject decision is Loan Approved: a 1,0 variable indicating whether the bank approved or denied the enterprise's request for a loan. As noted above, the loan was approved 83.1% of the time.
We group our explanatory variables into four categories: (i) the applicant enterprise's characteristics, including its (and its primary owner's) credit history and financial relationships; (ii) the characteristics of the requested loan; (iii) the characteristics of the relationship between the loan applicant and the bank; and (iv) the bank's characteristics. We will first present our general expectations as to the relationships between these variables and our dependent variable (Loan Approved); we will then discuss our more specific expectations as to the differences that we would expect to find in the behavior of larger banks and smaller banks.
A. General Hypotheses for the Accept/Reject Decision

A1. Firm Characteristics
Our general expectations fundamentally follow those of Udell (1993) and Berlin (1996) . Lenders will lend only when they have high expectations of being repaid and thus will strongly favor borrowers with characteristics that reassure the bank as to the likelihood of being repaid.
Firm Size is the applicant firm's sales in thousands of dollars, as of year-end 1992. We expect that larger applicant firms would be able to provide more reassurance to a bank that its loan would be repaid and thus would be more likely to be accepted for a loan. We expect a positive relationship Debt-to-Assets is the ratio of the applicant firm's debt to its assets, as of year-end 1992. 6 We expect that firms with lower debt ratios are less likely to become insolvent and thus would be more likely to be accepted for a loan. We expect a negative relationship between Debt-to-Assets and Loan
Approved.
Cash-to-Assets is the ratio of the applicant firm's cash to its total assets. A more liquid firm would likely provide greater reassurance to a lender of the prospects for repayment. We expect a positive relationship between Cash-to-Assets and Loan Approved.
Firm Delinquencies is the number of credit obligations on which the applicant firm was delinquent during the previous three years. 7 More past delinquencies should discourage a bank from lending to a loan applicant. We expect a negative relationship between Firm Delinquencies and Loan
Approved.
Owner's Delinquencies is the number of credit obligations on which the primary owner of the applicant firm has been delinquent during the previous three years. More delinquencies should discourage the bank from lending. We expect a negative relationship between Owner's Delinquencies and Loan Approved.
African-Am Owner is a 1,0 dummy variable indicating whether the applicant firm's owner was identified as a member of a minority (African-American) group. This variable may be the basis for indications as to whether the bank is practicing race-based discrimination. Alternatively, this variable may be playing a different role: The owner's personal assets and income are generally known by the bank, but were not reported in the survey data; and the owner's credit history is better known by the bank than is reported in the survey. Data from the Federal Reserve Board's Survey of Consumer Finances demonstrate that minority households have significantly lower asset and income levels and worse credit histories than do non-minority households. Hence, this variable may simply be a proxy for those asset, income, and credit-history differences. In essence, this variable is a proxy (albeit imperfect)
for an important component of the "credit score" of the firm's primary owner. Because greater owner assets and higher owner income should provide greater reassurance to the bank as to the prospects for repayment, we expect a negative relationship between African-Am Owner and Loan Approved at large banks. If, however, this variable is an indicator of race-based discrimination, we expect a negative relationship between African-Am Owner and Loan Approved at small banks, which are more likely to be located in more highly concentrated banking markets. This follows from Becker (1971) , who hypothesizes that racial discrimination should be more prevalent in less-competitive credit markets.
SIC X is one of a set of nine 1,0 dummy variables that indicate the one-digit SIC code of the applicant firm. 8 There may be some industry categories in which the borrowers are perceived to be less likely to fail and default and hence would be favored as loan applicants (or conversely). We have no strong expectations with respect to these variables.
A2. Loan Characteristics
Loan Amount is the amount of the requested loan in thousands of dollars. On the one hand, a larger loan is generally more profitable for a bank because there are fixed costs of applicant assessment and loan monitoring for a loan of any size; this would cause a bank to favor larger loans. On the other hand, there are loan portfolio diversification benefits from investing in a larger number of smaller loans, especially for a small bank. In addition, there are regulatory restrictions on the size of loan that a bank can make to one borrower, 9 which may make banks (especially small banks) averse to approving requests for large loans. Accordingly, we cannot make a firm prediction as to the sign on the relationship between Loan Amount and Loan Approved. The natural logarithm of the loan amount ln(Loan Amount) is used in our regressions.
Collateralized Loan is a 1,0 dummy variable indicating whether the requested loan was collateralized. 10 In principle, a loan that is collateralized is (ceteris paribus) safer from the perspective of the lender. If the borrower fails to repay the loan, the lender can seize the collateral, sell or liquidate it, and use the proceeds for the loan repayment. However, there may be substantial transactions costs to seizing and selling/liquidating, and the collateral itself may be worth less than was originally claimed by the borrower. Consequently, the benefits to the lender from collateral may be modest at best. Though we expect a positive relationship between Collateralized Loan and Loan Approved, this relationship may well be weak.
A3. Relationship Characteristics
Deposit Relationship is a 1,0 dummy variable indicating whether the applicant firm already had a deposit account (checking or savings) at the bank. This type of prior relationship should generally be favorable for a loan applicant because it provides more information about the applicant for the bank.
We expect a positive relationship between Deposit Relationship and Loan Approved.
Loan Relationship is a 1,0 dummy variable indicating whether the applicant firm already had another loan at the bank. The potential effects of this relationship are ambiguous. The prior loan relationship does give the bank additional information about the applicant; but that information could cause the bank to form a negative impression of the applicant. Further, for small banks the combined size of the applied-for loan, plus the prior loan, might trigger concerns about diversification of their portfolio and the regulatory restrictions on loans to one borrower.
Financial Mgt. Relationship is a 1,0 dummy variable indicating whether the applicant firm characteristics of the rejected loans to impute whether collateral was required of the rejected loans. This procedure produces a score between zero and one for each loan. We must then choose a value to split the loans into collateralized and not collateralized. Because 68% of the accepted loans were reported as collateralized, we chose a cut-off percentage that also resulted in 68% of the accepted loans being classified as collateralized, and then used this cut-off to classify the presence or absence of collateral among the rejected loans. This process resulted in 60% of the rejected loans being classified as collateralized, significantly lower than the rate for approved loans, just as theory would predict. The collateral variable that we use in our analyses (the actual presence or absence of collateral for the accepted loans, and the imputed presence or absence of collateral for the rejected loans) indicates an overall collateralization rate of 66% for our sample.
previously was obtaining financial management services from the bank. Financial management services include transaction services, cash management services, credit-related services, and trust services.
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This type of relationship should generally be considered favorable for the applicant. We expect a positive relationship between Financial Mgt. Relationship and Loan Approved.
Length of Relationship is the length of time in years of the longest relationship (if any) that the applicant has had with the bank. A longer relationship should generally give the bank more information about the applicant. Both Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995) examine the effects of the length of relationship. Petersen and Rajan find that their proxy for credit availability (the percentage of a firm's trade credits that are paid late) is negatively related to the length of the firm's longest relationship. Berger and Udell find that the loan rate premium is negatively related to the length of relationship and that the probability that collateral is necessary decreases with the length of relationship. On the other hand, Cole (1998) found that this variable was not significant for the loan approval process, implying that only the most recent information was important. We expect a positive or insignificant relationship between Length of Relationship and Loan Approved. The natural logarithm of (one plus) the length of relationship ln(Length of Relationship) is used in our regressions.
Number of Sources is the number of sources of financial services that are reported by the applicant firm. The greater are the number of sources of financial services, the greater may be the bank's worries that its ability to collect in the event of foreclosure may be impaired. Equivalently, the bank would prefer that the applicant firm have fewer sources of financial services and more of them with that bank. We expect a negative relationship between Number of Sources and Loan Approved.
A4. Bank Characteristics
11 Transaction services encompass the provision of paper money and coins, the processing of credit card receipts, the collection of night deposits, and wire transfers. Cash management services include the provision of sweep accounts, zero-balance accounts, lockbox services, and other services designed to invest liquid funds in liquid, interest-bearing assets automatically. Credit-related services include the provision of bankers' acceptances, letters of credit, and factoring. Trust services include the provision of 401(k) plans, pension funds, business trusts, and securities safekeeping.
Banks clearly do differ in their proclivities with respect to small business lending (Berger and Udell (1996) ; Goldberg and White (1998) ; DeYoung (1998); DeYoung et al. (1999) ; Berger et al. (2000) ). We have selected a single bank characteristic, bank size, that other studies have shown to be important.
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Bank Assets is the bank's total assets (in millions of dollars), as of the year-end preceding the loan application. As was noted in Section II, numerous studies have shown that larger banks tend to be less inclined to lend to small businesses than are smaller banks. We expect a negative relationship between Bank Assets and Loan Approved. The natural logarithm of bank assets ln(Bank Assets) is used in our regressions.
B. Specific Hypotheses for Large and Small Bank Differences.
The specific motivation for this paper is to test whether big banks and small banks differ in the way that they approach the loan application approval/rejection decision for small business loans. Big banks are likely to be more bureaucratic, and their loan officers are more likely to make decisions "by the numbers." Loan approval/rejection decisions are likely to be based on the loan applicant's easily verified financial data: a "cookie-cutter" process. Smaller banks may be less bureaucratic, and their loan officers may be able to use less formal and more subjective criteria in their decisions; "character" or relationship lending may be more important. Accordingly, we expect the formal financial data to be quantitatively and statistically more significant in explaining the lending decisions of large banks.
Conversely, we expect the formal financial variables to provide a less satisfactory fit for a regression that 12 In an earlier version of this study, we examined two additional bank variables. One was the ratio of the bank's "tier 1" capital to its risk adjusted assets, in the expectation that capital-constrained banks would be less inclined to approve loans. However, virtually none of the banks were at or below the regulatory capital minimum levels, and the variable consistently showed no effect. The other variable was the age of the bank, because DeYoung et al. (1999) have shown that de novo banks tend to lend less to small business as they grow older. However, almost all of the banks in our sample were older than 20 years, the cut-off point for an age effect in the DeYoung et al. study. Consequently, we do not discuss these variables in this version of the study. tries to explain the lending decisions of small banks, since these variables are likely to fail to capture the subjective criteria that small banks employ in their decisions.
In Table II , we divide our sample into 517 loan application observations involving "large" banks (those with consolidated assets of $1 billion or more, as of year-end prior to the loan application), and 585 loan application observations involving "small" banks (those with consolidated assets of less than $1 billion). For each group, we present means and standard errors for all of our variables, along with the differences between the means of the large and small banks, and t-tests on those differences. As can be seen, there are significant differences with respect to Loan Approved (small banks approve more of their applicants), ln(Firm Size) (large banks tend to receive loan applications from larger firms), Cashto-Assets (large banks receive loan applications from more liquid firms), ln(Loan Amount) (large banks receive larger loan requests), Deposit Relationship (applicants to small banks are more likely to have a pre-existing deposit account at that bank), Loan Relationship (applicants to small banks are more likely to have a pre-existing loan at that bank), Length of Relationship (applicants to small banks tend to have had longer prior relationships with the bank), and ln(Bank Assets) (large banks are, indeed, larger), and SIC 7 and SIC 8 (small banks are more likely to receive loan applications from business services firms, while large banks are more likely to receive loan applications from professional services firms). It is noteworthy that pre-existing relationships do seem to matter more for the applicants to small banks.
These differences in the applicant pools may well influence the overall pattern of accept/reject decisions observed for the two groups of banks. Consequently, not only must we control for the usual possibility of confounding influences through regression analysis, but we must also control for the potential bias that might be introduced by the applicant firm's choice of a large bank or a small bank.
We accomplish this by estimating a system of two disturbance-related equations, where the first equation explains the firm's decision to apply at a large bank or a small bank, and the second equation explains the bank's decision to approve or deny the firm's credit application, conditional upon the size of bank to which the firm chose to apply.
C. Hypotheses for the Applicant Firm's Choice of Bank
We are unaware of a prior literature --theoretical or empirical --that can guide us in trying to explain the applicant firm's decision to apply for credit at a large bank versus a small bank. Given this vacuum, we hypothesize that the characteristics of the enterprise, its owner, and the loan being sought (which we describe above) influence the enterprise's choice of a large bank versus a small bank. In principle, the applicant should seek the bank most likely to be sympathetic to the firm's specific mix of enterprise, owner, and loan characteristics. In essence, the firm should choose its bank on something approximating its subjective estimate of the regression coefficients that we report in Section IV. In practice, however, we are unsure exactly how these various characteristics would affect the applicant firm's choice with respect to a large or small bank. For example, would a small firm with a large loan request fear that its request might exceed the loans-to-one-borrower limitations of a small bank and therefore seek out a large bank; or would the firm fear that it might "get lost in the bureaucracy" of a large bank and therefore seek out a smaller bank, where it might stand out and receive preferential treatment? In the absence of theory or prior empirical research to guide us, we take an agnostic position: these characteristics may well influence an applicant firm's choice of bank, but we are unable to specify predicted signs.
We do include nine additional explanatory variables in our model of the choice-of-bank-size decision. Because larger banks tend to have their offices in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), while smaller banks tend to have their office in rural areas, 13 we expect that an applicant located in an MSA will tend to choose a larger bank. We attempt to capture this effect by including the dummy variable MSA, which takes the value 1 if the applicant firm is located in an MSA and 0 otherwise. Finally, we include a set of eight regional dummy variables REGION X, where X = 2, 3, . . , 9, indicating the Census Region in which the applicant firm is located. 14 The regional dummy variables are included to help control for regional variations in potential influences on the firm's choice of bank size, such as historical limitations on bank branching.
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D. The Bivariate Probit Methodology
To account for the nonrandom selection of firms choosing to apply at large banks versus small banks, we use a bivariate probit model with sample selection as proposed by Van de Ven and van Praag (1981) . This model involves the simultaneous estimation of two disturbance-related equations --a probit application equation, which is the basis for selection, and a probit denial equation.
The probability-of-application equation is:
where A * i is an unobservable index of the probability that a firm applies for credit at a large (small) bank; Zi is a vector of enterprise, owner, and loan characteristics developed in the previous sections; ?
is a vector of parameter estimates for the independent variables; ei is a normally distributed random disturbance term with zero mean and unknown constant variance se 2 ; and i = 1, 2, . . . , N, where N is the total number of firms.
Let Ai be an observable variable equal to one if A * i > 0 and zero if A * i < 0. In this particular application, Ai is equal to one when a firm applies for credit at a large (small) bank and equal to zero when a firm applies for credit at a small (large) bank. Since ?' zi is E(A * i | Zi), one can write the probability that Ai is equal to one as the probability that ei is greater than -?' Zi, or, equivalently, is 14 Census Region 1, the Northeastern United States, is our base case and does not appear in the choice-of-bank regressions. We use Census region rather than state location because the public version of the NSSBF does not identify the state in which the firm is located. 15 It should be noted that since the MSA and REG X variables appear only in the applicant's-choiceof-bank regressions, while the variables that capture the applicant's relationship with its bank (i.e., Deposit Relationship, etc.) appear only in the bank's approval/rejection decision regression, both sets of regressions are identified in a simultaneous system. greater than 1 -F(-?' Zi), where F is the cumulative distribution function of e, here assumed to be normal. The probability that Ai is equal to zero is then simply F(-?' Zi).
The probability-of-denial equation is:
where D * j is an unobservable index of the probability that a firm's loan application will be denied; Xj is a vector of enterprise, owner, and loan characteristics developed in the previous sections; ß is a vector of parameter estimates for the independent variables; µj is a normally distributed random disturbance term If there are unobserved or otherwise omitted variables that affect whether the firm applies at a large bank versus a small bank and that affect whether or not a firm's application is denied, then the error terms ei in eq.
(1) and µj in eq. (2) will be correlated because the equations omit the same variables. Estimation procedures that ignore the correlation between error terms will produce biased and inconsistent coefficients for eq. (2). To compensate for this correlation, we use an asymptotically efficient procedure: the joint estimation of eq.
(1) and eq. (2) by the method of full-information maximum-likelihood, assuming that e and µ come from a bivariate normal distribution with correlation coefficient ?. Since se cannot be estimated within this framework, it is normalized to one. As specified in Meng and Schmidt (1986) , the log-likelihood for this model is:
where F is the bivariate standard normal cumulative distribution function and f is the univariate standard normal cumulative distribution function. Estimates obtained by maximizing this log-likelihood account for the potential correlation between error terms; hence, they are unbiased, consistent, and asymptotically efficient.
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In presenting our probit regression results, we report the marginal effects of a change in each variable when all variables are evaluated at their means, rather than presenting the actual coefficient estimates, which reflect an arbitrary normalization. The marginal effects provide an intuitive way of describing the effects on probabilities, as well as providing the normalization that permits comparisons across similar equations.
IV. Empirical Results
The formal empirical tests of the hypotheses developed in Sections II and III consist of regressions in which Loan Approved --the 1,0 variable indicating whether a specific small business's loan application at a specific bank was approved or rejected by that bank --is the dependent variable and the remaining variables described in Section III are the right-hand-side independent variables. We are especially interested in differences in loan approve/reject behavior displayed by large and small banks.
As was discussed in the previous section, however, the loan applicant's choice of bank may influence the observed patterns of banks' behavior. To correct for this potential sample-selection bias, we estimate a bivariate probit model with selection, as discussed in Section III-D. This full information 16 Estimation was carried out using version 7.0 of the LIMDEP statistical package developed by Greene (1995) . The particular estimator used here first calculates maximum-likelihood probit estimates for use as starting values, and then uses a modification of the Davidon, Fletcher, and Powell algorithm (see Fletcher 1980 ) to obtain the final parameter estimates. maximum likelihood (FIML) procedure involves the simultaneous estimation of two probit equations: (i) the firm's decision to apply at a large bank or a small bank; and (ii) the bank's decision to accept or reject the firm's loan application, conditional on the type of bank to which the firm applied. We estimate this system three times: once for the full sample of 1,102 banks (using a bivariate probit without selection), once to select the sample of 517 observations involving "large" banks (with assets of $1 billion or more), and once to select the sample of 585 observations involving "small" banks (with assets less than $1 billion).
First, we will discuss the results for the equation explaining the firm's decision to apply at a large bank versus a small bank. These results do not differ qualitatively in any of the three separate systems that we estimate. Then we will discuss the results for the equation explaining the bank's decision to approve or reject the firm's loan request based upon (i) the full sample of 1,102 large and small banks, (ii) the selected sample of 517 large banks, and (iii) the selected sample of 585 small banks. Table III presents results from the probit regression model explaining the applicant's decision to apply for credit at a large bank versus a small bank, which was estimated simultaneously with an equation explaining the bank's accept/reject decision. The estimated coefficients and standard errors are virtually identical across the three systems estimated; consequently, we only present and discuss results for the first system (bivariate probit without selection). The dependent variable in the first stage of this system equals 1 if the firm applied at a large bank and zero if the firm applied at a small bank.
A. The Loan Applicant's Choice-of-Bank-Size Regressions
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As shown in Table III , the characteristics of the enterprise, owner, and loan have virtually no explanatory power with respect to the applicant's choice of bank size. Only one variable is statistically significant. Firms with a larger number of sources for financial services are less likely to apply at large banks than at small banks. If applicants believe our cookie-cutter hypothesis, then we would expect 17 Results for the other two systems are available from the authors upon request.
firms with multiple banking relationships to be more, rather than less, likely to apply at large banks. We also would expect significant positive coefficients on collateral, ROA, and Cash-to-Assets, and
Owner's Delinquencies, and significant negative coefficients on Debt-to-Assets Firm Delinquencies and Length of Relationship. This suggests that loan applicants do not believe that small banks reward relationships or that large banks favor collateral over character. The signs of each of these variables are consistent with the cookie-cutter hypothesis; however, none are statistically significant at even the 10 percent level.
In contrast, the MSA and REGION X variables are powerful forces in explaining the applicant's choice of bank size. As expected, the location of an applicant firm in an MSA has a strong positive and significant effect on the firm's tendency to choose a large bank. This is consistent with our hypothesis that firms located in rural areas will be more likely to apply at small banks than at large banks because most banks located in rural areas are small banks. However, an alternative explanation is that relationships are more important in rural areas, where the loan officer and borrower are likely to know each other in capacities other than borrower and lender. To take advantage of these relationships, the rural borrower applies at a small bank, where the loan officer can make use of his private information about the borrower, rather than at a large bank, where loan decisions are often made at regional or central offices by loan officers unfamiliar with the borrower.
The results in Table III also show that firms located in Census Regions 3 through 7 (the Southeast, East North Central, East South Central, West North Central, West South Central regions, respectively) are more likely to apply at a large bank than are firms located in the omitted Census Region, the Northeast. These latter results are somewhat surprising, in that few large banks are headquartered in the Midwest. Of course, these results hold only after controlling for MSA location and the set of enterprise, owner, and loan characteristics.
B. The Bank's Accept/Reject Decision Regressions: All Banks
Table IV presents results from the probit regression model that explain the bank's accept/reject decision, estimated simultaneously with the applicant's decision to apply for credit at a large bank versus a small bank. The dependent variable is coded as 1 for loan applications granted and 0 for loan applications denied.
As shown in Panel A of Table IV , we find that, for the full sample, the hypotheses of Section III are generally supported by the empirical results. There is no selection in this variation of the bivariate probit model, so that both equations are estimated with the full sample of 1,107 firms.
B1. Firm and owner characteristics
With respect to the characteristics of the applicant firm, the coefficients of ln(Firm Size) and 
B2. Loan characteristics
With respect to the characteristics of the requested loan, the coefficient on ln(Loan Amount) is negative and significant, while the coefficient on Collateralized Loan is positive, though not quite significant at the 0.10 level. The negative coefficient for ln (Loan Amount) indicates that regulatory limitations on loans to one borrower and/or the diversification benefits of smaller loans are more important to the bank than the ability to spread fixed loan costs across more dollars. The positive coefficient on Collateralized Loan supports our hypothesis that banks favor loan applications that are collateralized, although this preference is not strong.
B3. Relationship characteristics
With respect to the relationship variables, none of the variables indicating pre-existing deposit, loan, or financial management services relationships or the length of the pre-existing relationship is significant at even the 0.10 level. This is in contrast to most previous studies, such as Petersen and Rajan (1994) , who find that the length of relationship had a positive influence on credit availability, and Berger and Udell (1995) , who find that the length of relationship has a positive influence on the terms of credit offered. However, those studies analyzed different dependent variables from an earlier survey of small businesses and did not include the three variables indicating pre-existing relationships.
18
The coefficient on the number of sources of financial services (Number of Sources) is negative and significant at better than the 0.01 level. This finding indicates that banks are less likely to extend credit to firms with multiple firm-creditor relationships, consistent with our hypothesis that banks prefer to capture all aspects of the firm's business, and consistent with the findings of Petersen and Rajan (1994) , Berger and Udell (1995) , and Cole (1998) .
B4. Bank characteristics
The coefficient on ln(Bank Assets) is negative and significant at better than the 0.01 level.
Hence, our results based upon micro-level data confirm the results of many other studies based upon more macro-level data: large banks are less inclined to make loans to small businesses than are small banks (Nakamura (1993) ; Keeton (1995) ; ; Levonian and Soller (1995); Berger and Udell (1996) ; Peek and Rosengren (1996) ; Weston (1996, 1998) ; Berger et al. (2000) ).
B5. A summation
Overall, the general hypotheses developed in Sections II and III hold up quite well when we use the full sample to analyze the bank's decision to approve or reject a small firm's loan application.
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While we are unaware of any straightforward way of showing the overall significance of this regression, which was estimated jointly with an equation explaining the firm's decision to apply at a large or small bank, we have included in Panel A of Appendix Table I the identical specification of the loan approve/reject decision estimated using a single-equation probit model rather than using the bivariate probit model. It is worth noting that the coefficient magnitudes and t-statistics for the simultaneous FIML probit equation of Table IV and the single-equation probit of Appendix Table I are quite similar; and the latter equation easily passes a chi-squared test for significance.
C. The Bank's Accept/Reject Decision Regressions: Comparing Large and Small Banks
Panels B and C of Table IV present the results from estimating the accept/reject decisions of 19 Some (primarily large) banks appear more than once in the sample because they received loan applications from more than one sample firm. To test whether this "panel" aspect of the sample has a qualitative effect on our results, we estimate a "fixed-effects" linear probability model for the full sample and for the large-bank and small-bank subsamples, where a separate 1,0 dummy variable is included to identify each bank that appears more than once in the sample. (We are forced to use the linear probability model because, in many cases, a bank with multiple loan applications either accepted (or rejected) all of the sample applications. Under these circumstances, neither the probit or logit model will converge to a maximum of the likelihood function.) When we estimate the fixed-effects linear probability model, our results regarding the financial and relationship variables are qualitatively unchanged both for the full sample and for the large and small bank subsamples, even though a number of the fixed-effects dummies are statistically significant. These results are available to the reader upon request. Table IV presents the results of t-tests for significant differences in the large-bank and small-bank coefficients.
C1. Firm and owner characteristics
The coefficient of ln(Firm Size) is positive and significant at better than the 0.01 level in both the large-bank and small-bank regressions, indicating that both large banks and small banks are more likely to approve loan requests from larger firms. However, the coefficient for large banks is more than three times that for small banks, and the difference between the two is significant. This difference is consistent with our framework.
The coefficient of ln(Firm Age) is positive and significant at better than the 0.10 level in both regressions, indicating that both large and small banks are more likely to extend credit to older firms.
The coefficient for large banks is twice that for small banks, suggesting that observed longevity of the applicant is more important for large banks. However, the difference in coefficients is insignificant.
The coefficient of ROA is small and insignificant in both regressions. There are at least three explanations for this. First, both large and small banks may place little faith in the historical profitability data as an indication of the credit-worthiness of a prospective borrower. The owners of small firms seek to take maximum advantage of the tax deductibility of business expenses, which often masks the true profitability of such firms. Second, owners of small firms may well be financially unsophisticated and may report the profitability with such error as to render this measure useless to the lender. Third, historical profitability may be a poor indicator of future performance for small firms.
The coefficient of Debt-to-Assets is negative and significant at better than the 0.10 level for large banks, but is positive and insignificant for small banks. The difference in the two coefficients is significant at better than the 0.10 level. The significant negative relationship that holds at large banks is consistent with our hypothesis that large banks rely more heavily than do small banks on standard financial information. The insignificance of this variable for smaller banks may reflect the superior nonformal and non-financial information that a smaller bank is likely to possess about its loan applicants.
The coefficient of Cash-to-Assets is positive and significant at better than the 0.05 level for large banks, but is negative and insignificant for small banks. The difference in the two coefficients is significant at better than the 0.05 level. The significant positive relationship that holds at large banks is consistent with our hypothesis that large banks rely upon standard financial ratios while small banks make use of superior non-financial and informal information about the borrowers.
The coefficient of Firm Delinquencies is negative and significant at better than the 0.05 level for small banks, but is negative and insignificant for large banks. These results imply that small banks are quite sensitive to the applicant firm's credit history while large banks are not, which is contrary to our hypothesis that large banks rely upon standardized requirements more heavily than do small banks.
However, the difference between the two coefficients is not significant.
The coefficient of Owner's Delinquencies is negative for both groups of banks, but only the coefficient for the small banks is significant at better than the 0.10 level. While the difference in the coefficients is not statistically significant, these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that small banks rely upon the "character" of the borrower more heavily than do large banks.
The coefficient of African-Am Owner is negative and significant for large banks but positive and insignificant for small banks, and this difference is significant at better than the 0.10 level. These results could be interpreted as evidence of racial discrimination by large banks, but the bureaucratized environment of the large banks seems unlikely to support such behavior. Moreover, it is at odds with theory, which suggests that discrimination would be more likely at small banks because they are more likely than large banks to enjoy some degree of monopoly power (e.g., in rural areas). A more plausible interpretation is that this variable is a proxy for the owner's personal wealth, income, and credit history, which are known to the bank by way of commercially available credit reports. If we accept this interpretation, then these results suggest that large banks are sensitive to these numbers, while small banks are more concerned with the "character" of the borrower and look past them.
C2. Loan characteristics
The coefficient for ln (Loan Amount) is negative and significant at better than the 0.01 level for small banks and is negative but insignificant for large banks. This evidence supports the hypothesis that small bank lending is constrained by diversification and regulatory requirements (such as limitations on the amount of lending to one borrower). The difference in the magnitudes of the coefficients, however, is insignificant.
The coefficient for Collateralized Loan is positive but insignificant for both groups. The coefficient for large banks is twice the size of the coefficient for small banks, which is consistent with our expectation that the loan officers of larger banks would be more receptive to the "tangible" feature that collateral brings to a loan application. But the difference in the magnitudes of the coefficients is not statistically significant.
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C3. Relationship characteristics
The coefficient for Deposit Relationship is negative and insignificant for large banks but is positive and significant at better than the 0.05 level for small banks. These findings suggest that small banks, but not large banks, favor an applicant that had a pre-existing deposit relationship with the bank. 21 We also split the sample into collateralized and uncollateralized loan applications. We found that banks continue to be concerned about the characteristics of the borrower when the loan can be collateralized, which is consistent with the notion that the transactions costs of foreclosing and liquidating collateral are sufficiently high to make banks wary of relying solely on collateral for repayment.
These results strongly support Nakamura (1993) , who argues that small banks are best able to use the information that is yielded by a borrower's deposit account for monitoring purposes. The difference in the magnitudes in the coefficients is not statistically significant.
The coefficient for Loan Relationship is positive and insignificant for large banks but is negative and significant at better than the 0.01 level for small banks. The difference in coefficients is significant at better than the 0.05 level. To the extent that a pre-existing loan places a small bank close to the regulatory constraints on credit to one borrower, these results are consistent with our "cookie-cutter versus character" hypothesis. However, if we interpret this variable solely as a measure of the strength of the firm-creditor relationship, these results run counter to our hypothesis.
The coefficient of Financial Mgt. Relationship is positive for small banks and negative for large banks. This is consistent with our hypothesis that such pre-existing relationships are important to small banks but not to large banks. However, the difference in coefficients is not statistically significant for either group.
The coefficient of Length of Relationship is positive for small banks and negative for large banks. The signs on these coefficients are consistent with our hypothesis that longer relationships are important to small banks but not large banks, but neither coefficient nor the difference in coefficients is statistically significant. These results also run contrary to previous studies of relationship lending, which find the length of relationship to be a positive and significant influence on credit availability as measured by the use of trade credit (Petersen and Rajan, 1994) and on the terms of lending --i.e., the loan rate and collateral requirements imposed by the lender (Berger and Udell, 1995) . However, those studies examined data from a different survey conducted during a less favorable economic environment, and did not include the three addition measures of the firm-creditor relationship examined here, i.e., the dummies for pre-existing deposit, loan, and financial management relationships.
The coefficient of Number of Sources is negative for both groups and is significant at better than the 0.05 level for large banks. The coefficient for large banks is more than three times the size of the coefficient for small banks, but the difference in coefficients is insignificant. These findings are consistent with the theory that banks prefer to be a firm's sole source of financial services, but are inconsistent with our hypothesis that this preference is more important to small banks than to large banks.
C4. Bank characteristics
The coefficient of ln (Bank Assets) is negative and significant at better than the 0.01 level for both groups of banks, but the difference in coefficients is insignificant. Hence, the tendency of larger banks to be less interested in making loans to small business applies not only to the entire sample, but also to the variation in size within each sub-sample.
C5. Firm's standard industrial classification
Large banks are significantly more likely to approve loan applications from firms in the retail trade (SIC 5b), insurance and real estate (SIC 6), business services (SIC 7), and professional services We are unaware of a straightforward way to perform the equivalent of a Chow test for results from these bivariate probit regressions, which could indicate whether the large-bank and small-bank regressions come from the same common model. However, in Appendix Table I , we present singleequation probit regressions for the large banks and small banks that use the same explanatory variables as are found in Table IV . As can be seen, the coefficients and t-statistics in Appendix Table I and in   Table IV are quite similar. For the single-equation probit regressions shown in Appendix Table I , an Ftest can be performed on the separate large-bank and small-bank probit regressions and the full-sample probit regression. The results of such a test indicate that the null hypothesis --that the large-bank and small-bank regressions came from the same common model --can be rejected at a 95% confidence level. Given the similarity of coefficients and t-statistics, it seems likely that the same would be true for results obtained using the bivariate probit model and shown in Table IV .
D. A Summing Up
Our model of the loan accept/reject decisions for the full sample of banks does a respectable job of explaining the banks' decisions to extend or deny credit in terms of our general hypotheses.
However, the results for the full sample mask important differences between large banks and small banks in the criteria used to approve or reject loan applications. The two separate regressions for large banks and for small banks (which are estimated simultaneously with regressions that explain the loan applicant's decision to apply at a large or a small bank) demonstrate a number of significant and important differences. These regressions show that large banks, but not small banks, are less likely to extend credit to firms with greater leverage and to minority-owned firms (a likely proxy for the owner's wealth, income, and credit history) and are more likely to extend credit to firms with greater cash reserves. Small banks appear to look past the potential problems of leverage, cash reserves, and the owner's financial condition (as proxied by minority status). On the other hand, small banks are more sensitive to past delinquencies by the applicant firm or its owners. Further, small banks, but not large banks, are more likely to extend credit to firms with which they had pre-existing deposit relationships and are less likely to extend credit to firms with which they had pre-existing loan relationships. Small banks also are less likely to extend credit to firms asking for larger loan amounts. Finally, large banks and small banks have different proclivities toward approving loan applications from firms in various industry categories.
Overall, these differences in results for the large bank and small bank loan accept/reject decision regressions generally support the belief that a small bank tends to be more sensitive to its "relationship"
with the borrower, to be more inclined to rely on "character" and less reliant on just "going by the numbers." However, there are inconsistencies to this pattern, such as the greater sensitivity of small banks to the past delinquencies of the applicant firm and the irrelevance for small banks of the length of the relationship with the applicant firm.
V. Conclusions
Anecdotal evidence suggests that large banks use standard quantitative sets of criteria in their decision to approve or deny small-business loan applications, whereas small banks employ more qualitative criteria based upon their loan officers' personal interactions with and assessments of loan applicants. We provide empirical evidence that large banks and small banks differ in their approach to making small-business loans. In general, this evidence suggests that large banks employ more of a "cookie-cutter" approach to small-business l ending in order to control for agency problems and to maintain consistent loan standards throughout the banks offices. Small banks, in contrast, appear to rely more heavily upon "character" and pre-existing relationships, paying less attention to formal financial variables. Small banks often face less of an agency problem and are likely to have superior knowledge about their small-business borrowers. Thus, small banks have a greater tendency than do large banks to use a more discretionary approach.
This study deals only with the extension or denial of small-business loan requests; it does not address determinants of the terms on which the loans are extended, such as the interest rates or collateral requirements. If large banks are less likely to extend credit to small businesses than are small banks, as we find, then small firms must expect to receive more favorable terms from large banks than from small banks. To obtain a full picture of differences in the lending process, these factors need to be examined with respect to the different approaches between large and small banks in small business lending. We leave the analysis of these factors as a fruitful area of future research. For each variable in column 1, columns 2 and 3 (4 and 5) present the mean and standard error based upon the large-bank (small-bank) sub-samples. In column 6 are the differences in the large-bank and small-bank means and in column 7 are the results of t-tests for statistically significant differences in the large-bank and small-bank means. a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
(1) In Panel A, the full sample of 1,102 observations is used in estimation of bank's decision to extend or deny credit, simultaneous with the firm's decision to apply for credit at a large bank or a small bank. In Panel B (Panel C), the selected sample of 517 observations for large banks (585 observations for small banks) is used in estimation of the bank's decision to extend or deny credit, simultaneous with the firm's decision to apply for credit at a large bank (small bank). Results for the firm's decision to apply for credit at a large or small bank appear in Table III . For each variable identified in column 1, the panels present the variable's estimated marginal effect and t-statistic. In panel D is the result of a t-test for significant differences in the large-bank and small-bank marginal effects. a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. In Panel A, the full sample of 1,102 observations is used in estimation of bank's decision to extend or deny credit. In Panel B (Panel C), the selected sample of 517 observations for large banks (585 observations for small banks) is used in estimation of the bank's decision to extend or deny credit. For each variable identified in column 1, the panels present the variable's estimated marginal effect and t-statistic. In panel D is the result of a t-test for significant differences in the largebank and small-bank marginal effects. a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
